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PREFACE FROM VICE CHANCELLOR UiTM 
It is such a great honour for me to be given the opportunity to preface the inaugural issue of 
the Malaysian Accounting Review (MAR), the first international refereed accounting journal 
in this country. I wish to congratulate the Faculty of Accountancy, UiTM and the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) for their proactive effort in making this journal a reality. In the 
words of Zig Ziglar,"... if you have a vision for it, you can accomplish it". This marks a new 
beginning and a significant milestone for the accounting profession: practitioners and 
academicians at large. 
This pioneering smart partnership between MIA and UiTM is timely and hignly commendable. 
Today, we live in an era where information must be properly managed and strategically 
used as our competitive tool. To best manage and use the information, we must integrate 
descriptive and prescriptive applications. Whilst professional journals focus on descriptive 
and "what is" measures, academic refereed journals provide support to the accounting 
profession by prescribing the "what should" phenomena through research findings and 
empirical evidence. Both measures must be embedded and should be in tandem with each 
other; it is the only way for the accounting profession to stay on the cutting edge. It is 
without doubt that MAR will act as a catalyst to bridge the gap between theory and practice. 
The publication of the MAR is part of UiTM and MIAs mission to make Malaysia a renowned 
and reputable centre of accounting excellence in this region. Whilst the journal provides an 
excellent avenue for researchers (both local and foreign) to publish their research findings, 
it should also serve as a platform for intellectual discourse, for others. 
In closing, I wish to congratulate the Faculty of Accountancy, UiTM, for its vision in initiating 
a smart partnership with MIA. To MIA, I am sure that this partnership is an added value to 
your role as a regulatory body to the accounting profession in Malaysia. 
Datuk Professor Dr Ibrahim Abu Shah 
Vice Chancellor 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) 
MALAYSIA 
UiTMATAGLANCE 
Universiti Teknologi MARA (UiTM) started as a college known as Kolej RIDA in 1956. 
Incidentally, accounting programs such as LCCI, Australian Society of Accountants (ASA) 
and Institute of Cost and Work Accountants (ICWA) were among the pioneer programs 
offered by the then, School of Accountancy. Kolej RIDA continued to expand and in 1967 it 
was further upgraded and its name was changed to Institute Teknologi MARA (ITM). 
As an Institute, ITM continued to add other accounting programs: Diploma in Accountancy 
(DIA), Malaysian Association of Certified Public Accountants (MACPA), Association of 
Certified and Chartered Accountants (ACCA), Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) and the Advanced Diploma in Accountancy (ADIA) to its portfolio. What 
started, as a humble beginning in a small campus in Petaling Jaya was later expanded to 
other areas throughout the country. In 1996, the ITM Act was amended to allow the institute 
to offer various programs, viz., first degrees, Masters degrees and PhD programs. To 
commensurate with the university type of programs that the Institute was offering, ITM was 
officially conferred the university status in 1999. With effect from 26 August 1999, the 
Institute was known as Universiti Teknologi MARA or UiTM with 18 faculties and 13 branch 
campuses to its credit. 
Today, being one of the most dynamic faculties in UiTM, the Faculty of Accountancy is also 
offering other accounting programs such as the Certified Accounting Technicians (CAT-
UK), CPAAustralia, Institute 9f Chartered Secretaries and Administration (ICSA-UK), Master 
of Accountancy and Doctor of Philosophy (PhD Accounting). Within the next year, several 
new programs such as Accounting Information System (AIS), Taxation, Management 
Accounting, Internal Auditing, Corporate Governance and Forensic Accounting and the newly 
known Malaysian Institute of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) will be offered. 
The Faculty's two-tier mission allows it to focus on two important aspects; nurturing of 
professional accounting graduates as well as becoming a renowned Centre of Excellence 
in Accounting Research & Consultancy. In tandem with our two-tier mission, the Faculty of 
Accountancy strives to produce quality graduates and quality research & consultancy. 
PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE 
On behalf of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), I would like to congratulate 
Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM) for its timely effort in initiating the publication of the 
'Malaysian Accounting Review'. The Malaysian Institute of Accountants is indeed pleased 
to be associated with this publication, which is the first international refereed academic 
accounting journal in this country. The Malaysian Accounting Review is a vital platform for 
which various key areas useful to the development of the accountancy profession can be 
examined, analysed and digested. Indeed, this inaugural publication will serve as a catalyst 
and act as an important tool for students, researchers, accountants, academicians as well 
as other relevant parties to enhance their knowledge in these areas. 
As the regulatory body for the accountancy profession in this country, MIA recognizes the 
need to provide continuous support and to be involved in research and development activities 
relating to the accountancy profession. We believe that this smart partnership between the 
accounting academicians and the profession will strengthen MIA's position to become a 
globally recognized and respected business partner committed to nation building. With the 
continued support and cooperation from all stakeholders and through this publication of the 
Malaysian Accounting Review, we are confident that the profession will further progress in 
its commitment towards making the country a center of accounting excellence. 
Abdul Samad Haji Alias (Dr) 
President 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
THE MALAYSIAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS 
The Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) is a statutory body set up under the Accountants 
Act, 1967 to regulate and develop the accountancy profession in Malaysia. The functions of 
MIA are, inter alia: 
• To regulate the practise of the accountancy profession in Malaysia 
• To promote in any manner it thinks fit, the interests of the accountancy profession in 
Malaysia; 
• To provide for the training and education by the Institute or any other body, of persons 
practising or intending to practise the profession; 
• To determine the qualifications of persons for admissron as members; and 
• To approve, regulate and supervise the conduct of the Qualifying Examination 
Vision of MIA 
To be a globally recognised and respected business partner committed to nation-building. 
Mission of MIA 
To develop, support and monitor quality and expertise, consistent with global best-practises 
in the accountancy profession in the interests of stakeholders. 
MIA regulates its members who are Chartered Accountants in public practice, commerce 
and industry, the public sector and academia. A qualified person who wishes to hold himself 
or herself out as a Chartered Accountant or an accountant in Malaysia has to be registered 
with MIA. 
MIA is responsible for promoting and regulating the accountancy profession in Malaysia. 
The Institute is actively involved in the development and issuance of approved auditing 
standards and also participates in the development of applicable approved accounting 
standards by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board. Additionally, MIA also actively 
participates in legislative initiatives and developments, spearheaded by the Securities 
Commission, the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange and Bank Negara Malaysia. These initiatives 
relate to the regulation of the capital and financial markets, corporate governance, and the 
Companies Commission of Malaysia, in the regulation of companies pursuant to the 
Companies Act 1965. 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTANCY RESEARCH 
AND EDUCATION FOUNDATION 
The Malaysian Accountancy Research and Education Foundation (MAREF), a trust for the 
promotion, encouragement and advancement of accountancy research and education in 
Malaysia, was set up in 1990 and received its certificate of registration as a corporate body 
under the Trustees (Incorporation) Act 1952 on 26 July 1993. MAREF is a trust body spon-
sored by the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
The objectives of MAREF inter alia are: 
1. To encourage and promote the advancement and development of accountancy in 
Malaysia. 
2. To pay all or part of the fees payable including other expenses incurred and/or incidental 
to the education, training and/or maintenance in respect of deserving persons who 
are being educated or wish to be educated or wish to be trained in the accountancy 
profession in recognised institutions of learning. 
3. To carry out such other legally charitable purposes for the advancement of education 
and training in the accountancy profession. 
4. To carry out research in and to promote development of the profession of accountancy 
in general and in particular the development of accounting and auditing standards. 
5. To publish and disseminate literature in advancement of the accountancy profession. 
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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE AND DISSEMINATON OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES INVESTMENT INFORMATION 
Zubaidah Zainal Abidin 
Universiti Teknologi MARA 
and 
Dennis Taylor 
University of South Australia 
ABSTRACT 
This study seeks to bring three theoretical perspectives to bear on 
uncovering motives for the disclosure of human resource (HR) investment-
related information in corporate annual reports. Institutional, agency and 
resource-dependency theories of organizational behaviour are used to 
support arguments about attitudes of finance managers and HR managers 
to such disclosure decisions. Drawing from listed companies in Malaysia, 
a field survey was conducted amongst the finance and HR managers of 
those companies. Malaysia is particularly suitable for this study because 
corporations have relatively high levels of investment in human resources 
(mainly training and development expenditure) due to federal government 
subsidies. The survey results reveal contrasts in the significance of 
relationships between institutional, agency and resource dependency-
driven variables and the extent of corporate disclosure ofHR information. 
Multiple-theory modelling implications for studies of corporate disclosures, 
as well as practical implications of the findings for the voluntary corporate 
reporting of HR information, are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study brings multiple theoretical arguments to bear on seeking to uncover management 
motives for the corporate disclosure of human resource (HR) investment information (and 
related aspects of employee welfare). In the literature on social accounting, HR-related 
information is treated as one element of corporate "social responsibility" disclosure, along 
with the corporation's performance in relation to environmental impacts, community service 
and consumer welfare (e.g., American Accounting Association, 1971; Estes, 1976). The 
practice of corporate social reporting was prominent in the 1970s, with particular attention 
to the reporting of corporate financial information of relevance and understandability to 
employees. The practice lost prominence in the 1980's because of resistance by 
managements of large corporations. It re-emerged in the 1990s with a greater emphasis on 
environmental reporting (Gray, et al., 1998). By 2000 a more comprehensive corporate 
reporting movement had emerged, as exemplified by the "global reporting initiative" 
(www.globalreporting.org) which promotes the practice of triple-bottom-line reporting. Within 
the triple-bottom-line framework, corporate disclosure of the development and maintenance 
of human capital is a primary element of the "social" component. This study considers the 
social accounting element of HR information disclosure in the context of annual reporting 
by listed companies in Malaysia. 
While HR investment (especially in employee training and development) and its disclosure 
is at the discretion of management in Malaysian companies, there is a federal government 
scheme that encourages the undertaking of this on a regular basis. Under this scheme, 
companies (with 10 employees or more) are subsidized through the Malaysian federal 
government's Human Resource Development Fund, after a mandatory levy of 1 % is extracted 
from their wages expense. Each company is charged this levy, regardless of whether it 
takes advantage of applying each year for its entitlement in the form of defrayment of allowable 
HR investment expenditures. This scheme has been promoted to the public by the 
government since its introduction in 1993. Such promotion has created a widespread 
expectation in the Malaysian workforce that corporate employers will undertake and report 
substantial HR activities, particularly training and skills upgrading of employees each year. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which companies take advantage of the scheme varies 
considerably from one year to the next, as evidenced by the Human Resource Development 
Fund's ratio of grant payments to levy collections (Human Resource Development Council, 
1998, 1999, 2000). Thus, there exists a relatively high but variable level of HR investment 
and associated HR activities by corporations in Malaysia, together with a government-
generated public expectation of disclosure of information about such activities. These 
circumstances add importance to decisions by management about the extent and range of 
voluntary external disclosure of corporate HR investment activities and performance. 
A British study by Balabanis et al. (1998) found that the practice of disclosure of HR investment 
(and related employee welfare) information tends to become subsumed in aggregate 
measures of "social responsibility disclosure" or only partially considered by measures of 
the ways advancement of women and ethnic minorities are facilitated. Why, then, is research 
warranted into the narrow area of corporate HR investment disclosure? To answer that 
question, the contemporary importance of investment in HR to a corporation's stakeholders 
needs to be established. 
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Business environments have progressively become exposed to high competition (usually 
global) and advances in communication technology since the 1980s. According to Harrell-
Cook and Ferris (1997), the need for enterprises to have a workforce that can produce and 
deliver products and services of quality, flexibility and dependability at low cost, means that 
the many organizations should treat their human resources as a valued asset to be maintained 
and developed. They argue that investment in HR is strategically imperative to corporate 
competitiveness. There is considerable evidence in the HR development literature that the 
competencies of the workforce of an enterprise are a primary source of sustained competitive 
advantage and successful long-term financial performance (Barney, 1991; Kinicki et al 1992; 
Wright and McMahan, 1992; Terpstra and Rozell, 1993; Huselid, 1995). According to Al-
Khayyat (1998), "one thing which is true about the twenty-first century is that the development 
of HR is no longer an option but a must". Many Chairpersons and Chief Executive Officers 
(in Malaysia where this study was conducted) make reference, in their statement in the 
published annual report, to the importance of their entity's human asset. To paraphrase a 
typical assertion found in CEOs reviews in their corporate annual reports: a well-trained 
workforce is the key to competitiveness and the more the company seeks excellence, the 
more employee training and education becomes imperative (e.g., President and CEO, ASTD). 
The research questions addressed in this study are whether the extent and range of disclosure 
of HR investment-related information in corporate annual reports, and the scope of use of 
internal and external channels for the dissemination of this type of information, are related 
to organizational behaviour variables embedded in institutional, agency or resource 
dependency theories. These three theories, are widely used as underlying bases to inform 
empirical research into managerial behaviour. Earlier studies of corporate social disclosure 
have sought to find support for both agency arguments (particularly through the political 
cost hypothesis) (e.g., Heard and Bolce, 1981) and legitimacy arguments (e.g., Cooper and 
Sherer, 1984). A contribution of this study is that it brings to bear on determinants of corporate 
social disclosure, a further set of arguments drawn from institutional, resource dependency 
and agency (through manager-stakeholder agency conflict) perspectives. 
The finance manager (i.e., chief financial officer or equivalent in this study) will have a major 
input into corporate external reporting decisions. Additionally, the HR manager (i.e., chief 
human resource officer or equivalent in this study) is likely to have input into that aspect of 
corporate external reporting related to HR activities and performance. Motives underlying 
such input by these managers may well be more multifarious than the general legitimacy 
and political cost perspectives on impressions management considered in prior corporate 
voluntary disclosure research. It is contended that specific aspects of institutional theory 
concerning 'management dominant logic', specific aspects of agency theory concerning 
'shareholder-manager agency conflicts' and specific aspects of resource dependency theory 
concerning 'shareholder versus employee dependency' can shape the motives of finance 
and HR managers as they provide input to the determination of HR-related corporate social 
disclosures. 
A MULTIPLE THEORY APPROACH TO THE MODELLING OF DETERMINANTS OF HR 
INVESTMENT DISCLOSURE 
Ulrich and Barney (1984) identify a lack of comparison and integration among perspectives 
of organizations which often results in an under-examining of many important similarities 
and differences in organizational behavior. They contend that a multi-perspective approach 
to organizational research can help to more fully explain certain behaviors and their 
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implications. As Hirsch et al. (1987) claimed, the strength of organizational research is its 
"polyglot of theories that yields a more realistic view of organizations". 
The three theoretical perspectives of institutional, agency and resource dependency are 
three alternative ways of thinking about influences on HR investment disclosure decisions. 
Each of the perspectives focuses on a different unit of analysis. From the institutional 
perspective, the unit of analysis is isomorphism (or legitimacy) between economic actors. 
This unit of analysis appears to stand in marked contrast to the resource dependence 
perspective, in which the organization and its relation to the larger environment is the primary 
unit of analysis (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). In the agency perspective, the principal-agent 
conflict of interest is the relevant unit of analysis. 
At first glance, these three units of analysis seem distinct. However, from a HR investment 
disclosure decision-making point of view, they are, in fact closely related. In the institutional 
perspective, the phenomenon of isomorphic behavior that tends towards legitimization of 
management's actions is the key unit of analysis. However, as managers engage in 
isomorphic behaviour (that is mediated by economic actors through transaction governance 
mechanisms), the accumulation of legitimacy concerns begins to take on its own structure 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1983). In the agency perspective, such a structure is called an 
organization, and it may be conceived as a bundle of transaction governance mechanisms 
with certain characteristics in common. In this sense, there is an aggregating relationship 
between the transaction as the unit of analysis and the organization as a unit of analysis. In 
turn, an aggregating relationship may exist between organizations and their resource 
dependencies as units of analysis. In this sense, resource dependencies are simply bundles 
of resource-providers that have certain characteristics in common. 
A discussion paper by Harrell-Cook and Ferris' (1997) brought institutional, agency and 
resource dependency theories to bear on the research question of why there is variability in 
emphasis placed by organizations on HR investment. However, no empirical evidence has 
been provided to support their contention that a rich model of the determinants of HR 
investment outcomes, or the disclosure of information about these outcomes, can be provided 
by the integration of these three theoretical perspectives. Triggered by Harrell-Cook and 
Ferris' (1997) study, our study attempts to consolidate a set of variables drawn from these 
theories. Instruments for measuring these variables are available from previous empirical 
studies in different contexts. They will be adapted where appropriate, to fit the empirical 
context of this study. 
Before considering measurement instruments, an explanation of the nature of these variables, 
their modeling in an empirical schema and the generation of testable hypotheses is required. 
The Institutional Perspective 
Explanatory variables arising from the isomorphic dimensions of institutional theory are 
identified by Kossek et al. (1994) in the notion of managerial dominant logic (MDL)1. They 
used this notion to examine HR manager's institutional pressures to support the adoption of 
employer-sponsored childcare as a form of organisational adaptation to change. They 
found three dimensions of MDL. These MDL dimensions were labelled 'management control', 
'environmental' and 'coercive'. These dimensions form an overall management orientation 
1
 The concept of management dominant logic, which was first developed by Prahalad and Bettis (1986), includes 
managerial practices, specific skills used by key actors, experiences stored within the organisation and cognitive 
styles used to frame problems in a specific ways (Bouwen and Fry 1991) 
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toward employer-sponsored childcare. Kossek et afe study supports previous research on 
the link between work practices and institutional influences (for example, Tolbert and Zucker, 
1983; Eisenhardt, 1988; Scott and Meyer, 1991). But no previous study has directly tested 
the belief that such institutional-theory-derived variables affect managers' decisions about 
disclosure of HR investment information. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to speculate that 
such relationship may exist. First, consider the normative perspective that 'management 
control' would be focused on increasing employees' productivity, job satisfaction, loyalty, 
and autonomy. This 'management control' over employees might be facilitated through the 
extent of disclosure of HR investment-related information. Second, consider the mimetic 
perspective that 'environmental' considerations would be focused on identifying and copying 
the most successful practices of other companies. This 'environmental consideration' might 
apply in relation to decisions about the disclosure of HR investment-related information, 
especially through external reporting. Third, the 'coercive' perspective that focuses on 
government compensation, cost-savings or the suitability of the existing labour market, 
could likewise impact on management decisions about the disclosure of HR investment-
related information. The strategy of disclosing and disseminating such information in 
response to various institutional influences is likely to be advocated more strongly by HR 
managers than finance managers. This is because HR information is more related to the 
HR manager's interests than many other types of corporate information under management 
consideration in decisions about what to disclose and disseminate to employees and other 
stakeholders. 
The above discussion leads to the generation of the following general hypothesis: 
H1 Components of management dominant logic arising from institutional 
pressures on top finance managers and HR managers respectively, 
are positively related to the organisation's disclosure of HR 
investment-related information. 
The Agency Perspective 
Next, in relation to the measurement of dimensions of agency theory, the notion of 
shareholder-manager agency conflict (SMAC) is the most relevant to a study of pressures 
on managers involved in determining HR investment disclosures. When managers have 
private information that is not available to the shareholders (i.e. information asymmetry), 
the shareholders can no longer verify whether managers' decisions are in accordance with 
shareholders' interests. This provides managers with the opportunity to shirk by making 
decisions that conflict with the interests of the shareholders (Rutledge and Khondkar 1999). 
Byrd et ai (1998) provide evidence on SMAC where incentives'for managers to act in their 
own interests arise in terms of the effort problem, the horizon problem, the differential risk 
preference problem, and the asset use problem. These four elements of SMAC are explained 
by Byrd et al (1994) as follows: 
(1) the effort-based problem relates to the manager's incentive to shirk, or to exert less 
than full effort in creating value for shareholders; 
(2) the time horizon problem involves retiring/leaving managers giving preference to 
investment or operating strategies that have lower costs and produce results more 
quickly than more profitable but expensive long-term investments; 
(3) the differential risk preference problem involves managers using their firm's investing 
and financing policies to avoid projects that are expected to generate long-term 
returns to shareholders, but short-term uncertainties to managers; 
55 
MALAYSIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, VOLUME 1 NO. 1, 2002 
(4) the asset use problem relates to an excessive misuse or personal consumption of 
corporate assets by managers which decreases shareholder value as these assets 
shift from productive to unproductive uses. 
These 'shareholder-manager' elements of agency conflict (SMAC), it is contended, could 
also be conceptually applied to the conflict of interests between employees and managers. 
While top finance and HR managers will not perceive themselves as agents of lower-level 
employees in their organisation (like they would perceive themselves as agents of 
shareholders), they are, nevertheless, in a similar position concerning their adverse selection 
behaviour. That is, they can control and filter corporate information that they release to 
employees (Hill and Jones 1992). When top finance and HR managers have control over 
aggregate information about HR investment activities and performance, it makes it difficult 
for employees to identify if management is shirking from acting in their interests. Current 
accounting and auditing standards and securities regulations are oriented to the disclosure 
of corporate information of relevance to shareholders, not employees. Therefore, the 
opportunity exists for top managers to take decisions in their own interests in relation to the 
disclosure of corporate HR investment (and employee welfare) information. In these 
circumstances, agency arguments of Byrd et al. (1994) could be extended the employee-
manager relationship in which a manager who participates in decisions about corporate HR 
information disclosure is likely to consider the consequences from the viewpoint of his or 
her personal work effort, employment horizon, risk preference and asset use. 
In relation to personal work effort and asset use, agency theory suggests that managers 
would seek to hide the fact that they may have been shirking in their effort or making excessive 
personal use of assets for perks. Management disclosure of information about HR investment 
activities and performance would be low and limited in scope if the information had the 
potential to reflect the extent to which managers were shirking or excessively using perks. 
Alternatively, if managers have a relatively short time horizon before retirement/transfer or 
are highly risk-averse, then HR investment information disclosure is also likely to be limited. 
This is because managers would be more inclined to adopt strategies to ensure short-term 
profits. Such strategies would include a de-emphasis on HR investment which, as previously 
mentioned, has been found primarily to be a strategy for successful long-term financial 
performance. 
These arguments lead to a general hypothesis about the relationships between the employee-
manager agency conflict problems and HR investment-related disclosure. This general 
hypothesis is: 
H2 Elements of manager-employee agency conflict applying to top 
finance managers and HR managers, respectively, are significantly 
related to the organization's disclosure of HR investment-related 
information. 
The Resource Dependency Perspective 
In relation to resource dependency theory, pressures on managers involved in HR investment 
disclosure decisions can arise from conflicting demands and uncertainties associated with 
two key constituent resource-providers - shareholders and employees. The resource 
dependence perspective is that organizations are comprised of internal and external coalitions 
that emerge from social exchanges to influence and control managerial behavior (Pfeffer 
and Salancik 1978). This perspective also assumes that the environment contains scarce 
and valued resources essential to organisational survival. As such, the environment poses 
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the problem for organizations of uncertainty in resource acquisition (Ulrich and Barney 1984). 
As explained by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), the resource dependency perspective requires 
firms to attract reliable supplies of critical resources. To maintain consistent relationships 
with these critical resource providers, the organization must adopt behaviors that resource 
providers deem acceptable. However, according to Banaszak-Holl (1996), dependency on 
constituencies (especially shareholders and employees) is not in itself problematic if 
resources are stable and sufficient. The problem arises because environments vary with 
respect to munificence (the abundance of resources) and uncertainty (the variability and 
complexity involved in acquiring resources). The decision to comply with the needs or 
demands of key resource-provider groups will depend on how abundant and stable resources 
are in a given market environment. Under favourable market conditions, the organization 
may not feel constrained to comply with the demands of these constituencies. Under less 
favourable conditions, the organization may have no choice (Banaszak-Holl, 1996). 
Aspects of resource dependency theory are embodied in Ullmann's (1985) model of 
stakeholder theory. Ullmann reasoned that the greater the power of particular stakeholders 
to impose penalties on, or withdraw resources from, the organization, the more ready 
management will be to voluntarily disclose corporate information thought to be of concern 
to such stakeholders. In terms of the relationships between shareholder and employee 
power on the one hand, and HR investment performance and disclosure, on the other 
hand, he argued that these relationships will depend on the relative power of shareholders 
versus employees to impose penalties on, or withdraw resources from, the organization 
and its management. 
This leads to the generation of the following hypothesis: 
H3 The perceptions of top finance managers and HR managers, 
respectively, about their organization's relative resource dependency 
on shareholders versus employees is significantly related to the 
organization's disclosure of HR investment-related information. 
METHODOLOGY 
Empirical Schema 
The empirical schema for this study, embodying the above hypotheses, is shown in Figure 
1. It depicts the relationships between independent and dependent variables to be used in 
this study, together with relevant demographic control variables. Among the demographic 
variables depicted in Figure 1 is the variable "managerial function". This demographic 
variable is treated as a "test" variable rather than a "control" variable because it is central to 
the way all the hypotheses have been generated. 
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FIGURE 1 
EMPIRICAL SCHEMA 
CONTROL 
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INSTITUTIONAL 
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(3 variables) 
Environmental I 
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Coercive 
AGENCY 
PERSPECTIVE 
(4 variables) 
Effort problem 
Horizon problem 
Risk preference problem 
Asset use problem 
RESOURCE DEPEND-
ENCY PERSPECTIVE 
(2 variables) 
Employee dependency 
Shareholder dependency 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
\ H 1 
H2 
w 
, / 
1 / / 
H3 
HUMAN RESOURCE 
INVESTMENT-RELATED 
DISCLOSURE 
(2 variables) 
Extent of disclosure 
(i.e., sentence count) 
Scope of disclosure 
(i.e., item count) 
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Sampling 
A survey was conducted amongst top finance managers and HR managers of listed 
companies from the Main Board of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). Duplications 
of companies that shared the same board of directors or top management team were 
eliminated, leaving 349 listed companies on the list. The minimum paid up capital of public 
companies to be listed on the Main Board is RM60 million. The questionnaire was sent 
separately to the chief finance managers and chief HR managers (or equivalent) of these 
companies, representing a mail out of 698 questionnaires. A total of 188 useable responses 
were obtained, giving a response rate of 27%. Of these responses, 88 (47%) were from 
finance managers and 100 (53%) were from HR managers. Because only 32 companies 
provided responses from both types of managers, it was not viable to base the analysis on 
paired sample data. The average age of respondents was 41.2 years and their average 
tenure in their present organisation was 8 years. The age, tenure and level of appointment 
of finance and HR managers were not significantly different. 
Variable Measurement 
In developing the independent variables, suitable instruments tested in selected prior studies 
were sought. Those drawn upon were as follows: Byrd et ai (1998) for the SMAC measures; 
Kossek et ai (1994) for the use of institutional theory measures about the concept of MDL; 
and Banaszak-Holl et ai (1996) for the use of resource dependency measures. Theoretical 
arguments by Tsui et ai (1992) on the effects of demographic factors are referred to for the 
choice of items relating to demographic information. 
Table 1 provides details of the independent and dependent variables' names, their acronyms, 
the items making up each variable and the scales by which the items are measured. 
TABLE 1 
Variables: Items and Scales 
Variable 
Independent: 
Manager-
employee agency 
conflict 
Effort problem 
Horizon problem 
-»» 
Differential risk 
preference problem 
Acronym 
SMAC 
EFFORT 
HORIZON 
RISKPREF 
Item 
Employee share option scheme 
Outside Board membership 
Participation in political, social or 
recreational organizations/clubs 
Internal mobility 
External mobility 
Investment in new T&D programs 
A changeover to latest advanced 
technologies 
Launching a new potentially "path-
breaking" product or service 
Scale 
4-point "benefit 
your company/ 
yourself 
scale 
4-point "likely/ 
unlikely" scale 
6-point "no risk/ 
high risk" scale 
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Asset use problem 
Management 
dominant logic 
Management 
control 
Environmental 
Coercive 
Resource 
dependency 
Dependency on 
employees 
Dependency on 
shareholders 
ASSET 
MDL 
MDLMC 
MDLENV 
MDLCOER 
RESDEP 
EMPDEP 
SHDEP 
Attractive salary 
Company car 
Club membership 
Plush working environment 
Free annual holiday 
National/international events 
Use of credit card 
Increasing employees' productivity 
Increasing employees' job satisfaction 
Fostering employees' loyalty 
Reducing the demands on supervisors 
for close supervision 
Social responsibility 
Caring policies 
Adoption of HR practices in line with 
competitors 
Enhancement of corporate image 
Ability to remain "state-of-the-art" 
Reimbursement from the Ministry's 
HRDF 
Insufficient suitable employees to 
justify costs for T&D 
Easy to externally recruit suitably 
qualified and experienced employees 
Employees unique experiences 
Employees specific expertise and/or 
qualification 
Strong corporate culture 
Continuing investment of single 
largest shareholder 
Continuing investment of top 10 
largest shareholders 
Non-violation of KLSE's regulations 
5-point "importance" 
scale 
6-point "agree/ 
disagree" scale 
6-point "agree 
/disagree" scale 
6-point "agree/ 
disagree" scale 
4-point "depen-
dency" scale 
4-point "depen-
dency" scale 
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Dependent: 
HR investment/ 
welfare disclosure 
Extent of 
disclosure of HR 
investment 
information 
Scope of disclosure 
of HR investment 
information 
Disclosure 
sentence count 
Disclosure item 
count 
Employment profile statistics 
Statistics on training & develop 
inputs and outputs 
Description on types of training & 
development programs available 
Comments on HR investment policy 
generally Rewards/awards to 
employees Welfare/recreation/s 
afetyactivities 
Other relevant miscellaneous 
employee-related information 
Counting the total number of 
different types of HR investment/ 
welfare-related disclosure items. 
Count of the 
aggregate number 
of sentences 
relating to the 
7 items 
Count the number 
of items (up to 7) 
with at least one 
sentence of 
disclosure. 
Validity and Reliability Checks on the Independent Variables 
To test the construct validity of the nine multi-item independent variables, principal 
components factor analysis was conducted. Results of this analysis confirmed the validity 
of the nine variables after some items were removed due to incorrect factor loading or low 
item-factor correlation. The variable measurements adopted, after adjustments were made 
to the items listed in Table 1, were as follows: 
• MDLENV loaded onto 2 factors. The factor associated with "mimetic behaviour" was 
retained, while the factor associated with "social responsibility" (comprising the two 
items of "social responsibility to give T&D opportunity to all" and "policies to care for all 
employees' needs") was dropped. 
• EFFORT was reduced to 2 items after dropping "Employee share options scheme 
participation". 
• ASSET was reduced to 5 items after dropping "attractive salary" and "plush working 
conditions". 
Each of these validated multi-item independent variables was checked for reliability using 
the Cronbach alpha statistic. The results were adequate: all variables had a Cronbach 
alpha of above 0.60. 
Potential confounding effects of demographic variables on the dependent variables were 
checked through bi-variate correlations. It was found that there were no significant correlations 
between either age of respondent, management level or length of tenure, and any of the 
dependent variables. 
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The Profile ofHR Investment and Welfare Disclosures 
Table 2 shows the frequency distribution from a content analysis of the 1999 annual reports 
of the 156 companies of respondents. Seven items of information were deemed relevant to 
the content analysis, namely, company employment profile data, quantification of training 
and develop inputs and outputs, descriptions of available training and development programs, 
descriptions of HR investment policies and objectives, rewards and awards to employees, 
employee welfare/recreation/safety activities, and other relevant miscellaneous employee-
related information 
The sentence count reveals that sampled Malaysian companies listed on the main board 
provide a moderate to substantial amount of space in their annual report to matters of HR 
investment and welfare. More than a quarter of a page of text (i.e., over 6 sentences will 
usually extend above a quarter of a page) is devoted to this information by 76.3% of the 
companies. In terms of the scope of disclosure, 75.7% of companies provide 3 or more 
relevant information items. 
TABLE 2 
Profile of HR Investment/Welfare Disclosure Sentence and Item Count 
Sentence Count: 
6 sentences or less 
7 - 1 2 sentences 
13 -24 sentences 
25 sentences or more 
Total 
Item Count: 
1 item 
2 items 
3 items 
4 items 
5 items 
6 items 
7 items 
Total 
Number 
37 
68 
37 
14 
156 
8 
30 
39 
30 
23 
19 
_7 
156 
Percentage 
23.7 
43.6 
23.7 
9.0 
100.0 
5.1 
19.2 
25.0 
19.2 
14.8 
12.2 
4.5 
100.0 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHESES TESTS 
It has been hypothesized that orientations and motives of top finance and HR managers 
arising from influences of management dominant logic, manager-employee agency conflict 
and shareholder versus employee resource dependency, are related to their company's 
disclosure of HR investment-related information. These three theoretical perspectives on 
the factors influencing HR investment-related disclosures are analyzed in turn, and the 
explanatory power of each theoretical perspective is compared from the viewpoint of finance 
and HR managers, respectively. Then the three models are combined to show the results in 
a single multi-theory model. 
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Effects of Institutional Theory's Management Dominant Logic 
Table 3 presents the results of multivariate regression analyses for the two sub-samples of 
functional managers in respect of H r 
TABLE 3 
Regression Results for the Effects of Institutional Theory's Management 
Dominant Logic on HR Investment-related Disclosure 
Finance Managers 
Dependent Independe - Std T- Sig T VIF 
Variable nt Beta Score 
Variables 
Disclosure: 
Sentence 
Count MDLENV -.026 -.220 .826 1.371 
MDLMC .367 3.186 .002** 1.334 
MDLCOE -.179 -1.769 .081 1.032 
R 
Model AdjRz=.135 
F value =5.516 
Sig F = . 002 
Disclosure: 
Item 
Count MDLENV -.010 -.084 .934 1.371 
MDLMC .410 3.595 .001** 1.334 
MDLCOE -.112- -1.116 .268 1.032 
R 
Model AdjRd=.153 
F value =6.227 
Sig F = . 001 
HR Managers 
Std T- SigT VIF 
Beta Score 
.441 3.321 .001** 2.079 
-.016 -.118 .906 2.196 
-.054 -.564 .574 1.084 
AdjR£=.168 
F value =7.608 
Sig F = . 000 
.302 2.222 .029* 2.079 
.122 .871 .386 2.196 
| .082 .834 .407 1.084 
AdjRz=.127 
F value =5.750 
Sig F = .001 
* Significant at .05 level; ^Significant at.01 level 
It was hypothesised in H1 that managers' decisions about the extent of disclosure of HR 
investment-related information would, first, be influenced by managers' mimetic behaviour 
of being in line with competitors and keeping up a corporate image and state-of-the-art 
practices (i.e., MDLENV). It is shown in Table 3 that MDLENV is a significant determinant of 
disclosure (sentence count) for HR managers only. That is, the volume of disclosure of HR 
investment information (not the scope of disclosure) is positively related to HR managers' 
needs to mirror the practices of competitors and maintain a good corporate HR image in the 
wider business community. In short, the results suggest that management dominant logic 
regarding mimetic environmental influences manifests itself through HR managers, not 
finance managers, pushing for a greater volume of external reporting of HR investment 
information. 
The second component of MDL, referred to as "management control" (MDLMC), is shown 
in Table 3 to be a significant determinant of HR investment disclosures (both sentence and 
item count) for finance managers only. Management control entails a management emphasis 
on the use of strategies to increase employee productivity, satisfaction and loyalty. The 
results suggest that disclosure in external annual reports is significantly positively affected 
by finance managers' beliefs in the need to foster "management control" over employees. 
In contrast, a strategy of external annual report disclosure as a means of achieving 
"management control" of employees is not found to be of significance to top HR managers. 
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There are also significant effects of the third component of MDL, coercion, on disclosure. It 
is to be noted that the variable, MDLCOER, includes a scale for the effect on the manager 
of perceived public awareness of the government's scheme that provides company 
reimbursement for completions of employee training and development programs. The results 
in Table 3 indicate that the volume of HR investment-related disclosure in external reporting 
is significantly positively affected by the extent of coercive pressures felt by top finance 
managers. 
Agency Theory's Stakeholder-Manager Agency Conflict 
In relation to H2, which refers to stakeholder-manager agency conflicts, Table 4 shows that 
the model has very poor explanatory power. The F value for the overall model is not significant 
for either measure of disclosure or for either sub-sample of finance and HR managers, and 
therefore H is comprehensively rejected. 
TABLE 4 
Regression Results for the Effects of Agency Theory's Stakeholder-
Manager Agency Conflict on HR Investment Disclosure 
Dependent 
Variable 
Disclosure: 
Sentence 
Count 
Finance Manager 
Independent 
Variables 
Std 
Beta 
T-
Score 
Sig T VIF 
EFFORT 
HORIZON 
-.092 
.110 
-.832 
.987 
.408 
.326 
1.086 
1.094 
HR Manager 
Std 
Beta 
7-
Score 
SigT 
-.119 
.125 
-1.164 
1.253 
.247 
.213 
VIF 
1.064 
1.026 
Disclosure: 
Item 
Count 
RISKPFER 
ASSET 
Model 
EFFORT 
HORIZON 
RISKPFER 
ASSET 
Model 
* Significant at .05 level; **Si 
-.111 
,209 
AdjR*-
F value 
Sig F = 
.005 
.110 
-.085 
.148 
AdjR*--
F value 
SigF = 
-1.027 
1.945 
= .033 
=1.724 
.153 
.046 
.966 
-.769 
1.346 
---.012 
= 741 
567 
gnificant at.01 level 
.307 
.055 
.963 
.337 
.444 
.182 
1.031 
1.027 
1.086 
1.094 
1.031 
1.027 
-.187 
.151 
\AdjR£= 
F value 
SigF = 
-.029 
.005 
-.136 
.228 
AdjF? = 
F value 
SigF = 
-1.818 
1.518 
.035 
=1.908 
115 
-.285 
.053 
-1.323 
2.291 
.029
 m 
=1.744 
147 
.072 
.132 
.777 
.958 
.189 
.024* 
1.080 
1.011 
1.064 
1.026 
1.080 
1.011 
Table 4 indicates that effects on the disclosure of HR investment information are not significant 
in terms of whether work effort by the respondent will benefit the company or the individual 
(EFFORT), whether the respondent expects to remain in the company for a short or long 
period (HORIZON), and whether the risk preference of the respondent is different in respect 
of their own current appointment and the company's investment opportunities (RISKPREF). 
There is evidence in Table 4, nevertheless, that concern by the finance managers for the 
ASSET variable is significantly positively related to the extent of disclosure, whereas concern 
by the HR managers for the ASSET variable is significantly positively related to the scope of 
disclosure. That is when the consumption of perks by top managers is high, finance managers 
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will be concerned to ensure a greater extent of disclosure of HR investment-related 
information, and HR managers will be concerned to ensure a greater breadth of disclosure 
of HR investment-related information. In both cases, this increased disclosure of HR 
investment information in annual reports to shareholders may be a way of 'managing' any 
potential shareholder concerns about the extent of consumption of perks by top management. 
The highlighting of the extent and scope of expenditure on the training and development of 
employees throughout the company may provide a basis for managements' arguments 
about the reasonableness of the amount of expenditure on their own perks. 
Resource Dependency Theory's Shareholders and Employees Effects 
In relation to H3 concerning the effects of resource dependency (RESDEP) on HR investment 
disclosure, the results in Table 5 are highly significant in terms of employee dependency, 
but are not significant in terms of shareholder dependency. The extent to which both finance 
and HR managers perceive employees to have built up unique experiences, obtained specific 
expertise and developed a strong corporate culture, will significantly affect disclosure of HR 
investment information in annual reports. Interestingly, Table 3 shows that perceptions by 
managers of corporate dependency on large shareholders for their continuing investment 
does not have an impact on HR investment disclosure. Therefore, H3 is accepted in relation 
to the effect on HR-investment-related disclosure of employee dependency, but not 
shareholder dependency. 
TABLE 5 
Regression Results for the Effects of Shareholders' and Employees' 
under Resource Dependency Theory on HR Investment Disclosure 
Finance Manager 
Dependent 
Variable 
Disclosure 
Sentence 
Count 
Disclosure: 
Item Count 
Independe -
nt 
Variables 
EMPDEP 
SHDEP 
Model 
EMPDEP 
SHDEP 
Model 
Std 
Beta 
.387 
.111 
AdjR'--
F value 
SigF = 
.285 
.064 
AdjRd = 
F value 
SigF = 
T-
Score 
3.901 
1.120 
--.144 
=8.314 
001 
2.745 
.614 
.064 
=3.985 
022 
SigT 
.000** 
.266 
.007** 
.541 
VIF 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
1.000 
Std 
Beta 
.417 
-.036 
AdjR*--
F value 
SigF = 
.364 
-.027 
AdjRi = 
F value 
SigF = 
HR 
r-
Score 
4.305 
-.375 
= .150 
=9.500 
.000 
3.663 
-.270 
.110 
=6.910 
002 
Manager 
SigT 
.000** 
.708 
.000** 
.788 
VIF 
1.062 
1.062 
1.062 
1.062 
* Significant at .05 level; "Significant at .01 level 
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Comparison of the Explanatory Power of the Three Theoretical Perspectives 
It is to be noted in Tables 3, 4 and 5 that each of the four regression models has produced 
a quite moderate level of overall explanatory power. These models have an adjusted R-
squared as low as .012, and no higher than .168. The institutional theory models and the 
resource dependency models have produced significant, but modest explanatory power, 
while the agency theory models have produced insignificant explanatory power. 
When the three theories are combined into a multi-theory regression model with eight 
independent variables (table not shown), the explanatory power of the regressions for finance 
managers is, for each of the two disclosure variable, stronger than for HR managers. The 
adjusted R-squared is .389 and .312, respectively, in the two regressions for the finance 
managers sample, but .238 and .148, respectively, for the HR managers sample. This 
comparative result suggests that top finance managers are more sensitive than HR managers 
to a range of influences when it comes to decision-making concerning the disclosure of 
corporate information to parties beyond management - even when the corporate information 
is HR-related. 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This study of the HR disclosure aspect of corporate social reporting has provided evidence 
on the strengths of institutional, agency and resource dependency theory-driven variables. 
These variables have been used to articulate aspects of the motives and orientations that 
top finance and HR managers bring to management decisions about the corporate disclosure 
of HR investment-related information. The results indicate that these variables, taken as 
separate theory-based models, provide weak overall explanatory power. Taken together as 
one multi-theory model, however, they provide quite strong explanatory power, although 
the multiple regression models for the sub-sample of finance managers are stronger than 
the models for the HR managers. This result can be interpreted as reflecting the greater 
influence of multiple theoretical arguments on motives of finance managers towards the 
function of corporate reporting generally, than on motives of HR managers towards the 
function of HR investment reporting specifically. 
In terms of hypothesis tests, institutional theory, as manifest in the concept of management 
dominant logic, was found to have a complexity of effects on corporate HR investment 
disclosure. Specifically, this disclosure was significantly associated with influences on finance 
managers of normative management control matters and coercive forces, and influences 
on HR managers of mimetic-environmental matters. An implication for the way management 
determines policies and practices on corporate disclosure of HR-related information is that 
a balancing of the control-and-regulatory focus of finance managers and the outside-practices 
focus of HR managers needs to be brokered within the management team. 
In contrast, agency theory, from a manager-employee agency conflict perspective, was 
found to provide limited explanation of corporate HR investment disclosure. The only 
significant relationship is the attitudes of finance and HR managers towards asset use. This 
result suggests that those managers making greater use of corporate perks will be willing to 
have more HR investment information disclosed, presumably as a means of offsetting any 
perception by employees or shareholders that managers are getting greater fringe benefits 
than employees. 
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Findings from the final theory, resource dependency, were found, in respect of dependency 
on employees, to strongly explain the extent and scope of external annual reporting of HR 
investment-related information. The influence on disclosure of perceived corporate 
dependency on employees proved to be equally strong for finance managers and HR 
managers. Since shareholder-dependency had no significant impact on disclosure, it can 
be concluded that HR investment information in annual reports is perceived by management 
to have relevance primarily to employees. This result supports Ullmann's (1985) argument 
that the greater the power of particular stakeholders to impose penalties on, or withdraw 
resources from, the organization, the more ready management will be to voluntarily disclose 
corporate information thought to be of concern to such stakeholders. The implication is that 
decisions about the extent of disclosure of HR investment-related information will have little 
consequence for the managing of relations between management and shareholders, but 
strong consequences for relationships between management and employees. 
Our study has implications for multiple-theory modelling of corporate disclosures. According 
to Ulrich and Barney (1984), the lack of comparison and .integration among perspectives 
often results in an under-examining of many important similarities and differences among 
organizational perspectives. Similarly, Hirsch et al. (1987) argued that a strength of 
organizational research is its polygot of theories that yields a more realistic view of 
organizations. There has been a dearth of survey research into the determinants of corporate 
social disclosure based on theoretical arguments beyond legitimacy theory and the political 
cost hypothesis of agency theory. This study provides a step forward in the application of 
multiple theories to the HR disclosure aspect of corporate social reporting research. It 
points to the fact that multiple theories can be effectively applied to comparative studies of 
the behaviour of finance managers relative to HR managers. 
The findings are subject to limitations associated with respondent biases inherent in survey 
research. As an exploratory study based on broad hypothesizes and set in Malaysia, the 
extent to which its findings can be generalized will need to wait for supporting evidence. 
This requires further empirical studies (both quantitative and qualitative) of the effects on 
voluntary corporate disclosure of the theoretical perspectives of management dominant 
logic, manager-employee agency conflict and shareholder-employee resource dependency. 
Within the limitations of the findings, some practical implications for the voluntary corporate 
reporting of HR investment information can be proffered. Findings in the area of MDL 
suggest a lack of coordinated thinking amongst management in the process of determining 
the extent and scope of disclosure of HR investment-related information in corporate annual 
reports. HR managers are found to have a tendency to focus on imitating reporting practices 
of other companies, whereas finance managers are found to emphasise 'management 
control' issues. To bring a comprehensive set of MDL thinking to bear on the process of 
deciding the social information content in annual reports, both MDL focuses need to be 
explicitly considered and balanced. 
A further practical implication of the findings relates to the manager-employee agency conflict 
perspective. There was found to be a significant increase in HR investment disclosure in 
response to a situation where management has higher consumption of perks. This has 
implications for corporate governance, suggesting the need to set and apply policies 
concerning the sharing of more sensitive agency-conflict-related information with employees. 
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